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Abstract The constitutional framework of Brussels is characterized by a plethora of
different governing bodies and an excessive fragmentation of competences. Leaving
the EU aside, the Brussels territory is governed by no less than six governments with
formal legislative power. The fragmented division of powers between the federal
State, the Brussels-Capital Region and the Communities, and the 19 Brussels munic-
ipalities, impedes an efficient and coherent metropolitan governance. This chapter
explores the relationship between different echelons of government in Brussels, the
type and scope of autonomous powers of the Capital Region and its special position
as the capital of Belgium. Section 4.2 elaborates on the main characteristics and
some of the fundamental flaws of Brussels’ constitutional framework. Section 4.3
proposes to simplify Brussels’ complicated multilayered institutional framework by
reinforcing the Brussels-Capital Region. The proposal consists of a combination of
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the transfer of certain community competences to the regional level and an integra-
tion of the municipalities in the Region, allowing the latter to develop a uniform and
integrated policy for the entire territory of Brussels.
Keywords Belgian federalism · Brussels · Capitals in federal states · City region ·
Division of competences ·Municipal amalgamation · Territorial decentralization
4.1 Introduction
The city of Brussels is literally at the heart of the Kingdom of Belgium. Geograph-
ically, the capital is located almost in the middle of the country. Constitutionally, it
plays an equally central role in the structure of the country, housing institutions of
various governments, and bringing together the population of different subentities
of the Belgian federation.
The constitutional frameworkofBrussels is characterizedby aplethora of different
governing bodies and an incredible fragmentation of competences. Leaving the EU
aside, the Brussels territory is governed by no less than six governments with formal
legislative power, allowing them to pass legislation within their specific field of
competence. This complicated framework is as much the result of Brussels’ demo-
graphic peculiarity—housing both Dutch- and French-speaking inhabitants—as it is
of the capital’s position in subsequent reforms of the Belgian federation. The diver-
gent views on the Belgian constitutional framework were hardest to reconcile in
Brussels. Consequently, only a complicated and asymmetric overlap of institutions
and competences could provide constitutional peace. The resulting framework is not
so much based on what is logical or workable for Brussels, as it is the result of a
vision on the rest of the country that didn’t fully match the reality of the capital.
Despite its intricate constitutional structure, Brussels appears at times to be more a
(malfunctioning) pacemaker than a healthy beating heart.
This chapter explores the relationship between different echelons of government
in Brussels, the type and scope of autonomous powers of the Capital Region and
its special position as the capital of Belgium. After elaborating on the main charac-
teristics and some of the fundamental flaws of Brussels’ constitutional framework
(Sect. 4.2), a twofold reform is proposed. Section 4.3 aims to rethink the institutional
framework of the capital by putting Brussels at the centre of its own constitutional
design: on the one hand, we propose to reinforce and simplify the competences of
Brussels as the primary federated entity governing its territory. On the other hand,
we suggest to rethink Brussels as a city by merging the current 19 municipalities of
the Capital Region into a single authority, coinciding with the regional authority.
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4.2 The Institutional Structure of Brussels
In this section the institutional structure of Brussels is clarified. A brief exploration
of the historical roots of Belgian federalism (Sect. 4.2.1) is followed by a system-
atic analysis of the different authorities with formal legislative power governing
the Brussels territory. Aside from the federal ‘Belgian’ government, a number of
federated entities hold specific devolved competences: the Brussels-Capital Region
(discussed in Sect. 4.2.2), the Flemish ‘Community’, the French ‘Community’, the
Brussels ‘Joint Community Commission’ and the ‘French Community Commission’
(discussed in Sect. 4.2.3, dealing with the exercise of so called ‘community compe-
tences’ within the Brussels territory). Moreover, the Brussels territory is divided into
19 separate municipalities with local autonomy. These are dealt with in Sect. 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Brussels as a Shared Capital
The primary fault line in Belgian society is centred around the linguistic and cultural
fissure which divides the north and the south of the country. In the northern part
of Belgium (Flanders) the population speaks Flemish, while the population in the
southern part of Belgium (Wallonia) speaks French.1 Over the past fifty years,
tensions between the two main linguistic communities have led the country to
transform from a unitary state into a federal state.
Belgium’s complex system of federalism was designed and amended over the
course of six consecutive state reforms between 1970 and 2014. Belgian federalism
is the product of a compromise between the opposing views from theDutch-speaking
Flemings and theFrench-speaking inhabitants of the country onhow the federal struc-
ture should be conceived. The long held Flemish aspiration for cultural autonomy
was coupled with the demand of French-speaking politicians for economic self-
government forWallonia.By1960, both communities pursued a reformof theBelgian
state in the direction of a federal structure in order to fulfil their own objectives. The
Flemings adhered to the idea of a federal state based on two main communities, the
Flemish Community and the French Community, whereby Brussels would (at least
partially) be part of the Flemish Community. On the contrary, the French-speaking
population envisioned a system of federalism consisting of three economic entities:
Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. Thus, the communities’ different aspirations led to
opposing ideas about the conception of a federal system for Belgium. The compro-
mise that emerged from this discussion consisted of the creation of two types of
overlapping federated entities: three communities and three regions.2
Both the communities and the regions were given full legislative and executive
power to exercise specific, formerly centralized, competences. As the communities
1Less than one percent of the population, living in East-Belgium, speaks German.
2Alen and Haljan 2013, p. 146; Popelier 2019, pp. 23–24.
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and the regions are exclusively competent over their attributed powers, conflicts
between federal acts and decrees (or ordinances) of the communities or the regions—
at least in principle—do not arise. Consequently, it was not deemed necessary to
establish a hierarchy between the different entities under Belgian federalism, in
contrast to other federal systems, such as the United States of America or Germany
(‘Bundesrecht bricht Ländesrecht’). In Belgium, the three regions and the three
communities are not subordinate to the federal state, and the decrees they issue
are equivalent to federal acts.3
In negotiations between Flemings and the French-speaking population regarding
the design and further development of Belgian federalism, one question has always
been on the table: what about Brussels? Belgium’s bilingual capital Brussels is both
one of themain factors keeping the country together, as well as a never-ending source
of conflict between the Flemings and the French-speaking population of Belgium.4
Brussels is a fiercely contested city claimed by both the Flemish Community and the
French Community as their capital.
Originally, Brussels was a city in which the great majority of the population
spoke Dutch, with the exception of a small French-speaking elite.5 The ‘Frenchifi-
cation’ process, which started after the independence of Belgium in 1830, gradually
changed the linguistic character of the city and the surrounding municipalities.6
Nowadays, about 90% of the inhabitants of Brussels speak French (either as a native
or learned language) while less than a quarter of the population of the city speaks
Dutch.7 The increasing francophone presence in Brussels (and Flanders) is a thorn
in the side of Flemish nationalists who insist that Brussels remains a Flemish city.
As WITTE described decennia ago: ‘(…) [This] specific language problem (…)
[grew] into a conflict that was to dominate Belgian politics for more than 20 years.
From 1960 onwards and until [the 1980’s] it was almost permanently fought out
in the most hostile of atmospheres, was accompanied by every form of spectacular
demonstration, caused great changes in voting patterns and gave rise to momentous
crises.’8
Generally speaking, in the Flemish conception of Belgium as a federal state
with two main communities, Brussels does not have an autonomous status. Brus-
sels is considered a territory under shared rule (condominium) of both the Flemish
community and the French community. On the contrary, French-speaking citizens
who adhere to the idea of a Belgium of three regions, view Brussels as a third
region, on equal footing with the two other regions. This vision scared the Flem-
ings as they feared permanent minorization in a ‘federalism with three’, with two
3Article 127, §2 Belgian Constitution; Article 128, §2 Belgian Constitution; Article 129, §2 Belgian
Constitution; Article 130, §2 Belgian Constitution; Article 134, al. 2 Belgian Constitution.
4Popelier and Lemmens 2015, p. 93.
5Billen 2013, pp. 73–75; Van Velthoven 1989, p. 21.
6Van Velthoven 1989, p. 21; Treffers-Daller 2002, p. 50.
7Janssens 2018.
8Witte 1987, p. 47.
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Fig. 4.1 The division of Belgium into four linguistic areas Source The authors
French-speaking entities.9 They rejected the creation of a Brussels Region on equal
footing with the Flemish Region. In the compromise as it stands today, Brussels is an
autonomous region, with a particular status, making it slightly inferior to the Flemish
Region and the Walloon Region.10
4.2.2 Brussels as an Inferior Region
At the heart of Belgian federalism lies the division of the country into four linguistic
areas: the Dutch-speaking area in the north, the French-speaking area in the south,
the German-speaking area in the east (East Belgium) and the French-Dutch bilingual
area Brussels-Capital in the centre (see Fig. 4.1). In the Dutch-speaking area, Dutch
is the internal working language of public administration and public officials must
use Dutch in their communication with the public. Dutch is also the mandatory
language operated in public institutions such as courts, schools, etc. The same system
is applied in the two other monolingual areas of Belgium. Only in the bilingual area
of Brussels-Capital do French and Dutch stand on equal footing.11
The Walloon endeavour towards autonomy in economic matters resulted in the
creation of three regions: the Flemish Region (coinciding with the Dutch-speaking
area), the Walloon Region (comprising the French-speaking and German-speaking
9Popelier and Lemmens 2015, p. 88.
10Delwit and Deschouwer 2009, pp. 1–2; Demol 1997, pp. 5–6.
11See Coordinated Acts 18 July 1966 on the use of languages in administrative matters, MB 2
August 1966.
58 J. Lievens and K. Reybrouck
Fig. 4.2 The division of Belgium into three regions Source The authors
areas) and the Brussels-Capital Region (coinciding with the bilingual area Brussels-
Capital) (see Fig. 4.2). The Regions have material competences in matters relating
to ‘territory’ and ‘economy’, such as labour market, energy policy, agriculture, envi-
ronment, mobility and transport, spatial planning, urban development, and local
government.12 Each region has a directly elected parliament and a government.13
The Brussels-Capital Region exercises the same competences as the other two
regions.14 Brussels is an autonomous region, which nevertheless remains inferior to
the Flemish Region and the Walloon Region with regards to certain specific matters.
Thus, it is only a ‘Capital Region’ and its legislative acts are called ‘ordinances’,
while the other federated entities issue ‘decrees’.Moreover, these ‘ordinances’ can in
some cases be subject to a limited administrative review (by the federal government)
and judicial review by the ordinary courts, a scrutiny that was not deemed necessary
for the ‘decrees’ of the other federated entities.15 Furthermore, when the Flemish
Region and the Walloon Region were awarded certain constitutive powers (as far
back as in 1993), the Brussels Capital Region was left with empty hands.
In the Sixth Reform of State (2012–2014), however, the difference between the
Brussels Capital Region and the two other regions has shrunk. Brussels recently
acquired certain constitutive powers as well (to decide inter alia the demarcation of
12Article 39 Belgian Constitution and Article 6 Special Act 8 August 1980 on Institutional Reform,
MB 15 August 1980.
13The Flemish Community Parliament in practice exercises both its own competences and those of
the Flemish Region (Alen and Haljan 2013, p. 147).
14Article 4 Special Act 12 January 1989 on theBrussels Institutions,MB 14 January 1989 (hereafter:
Special Brussels Institutions Act).
15Articles 9 and 45 Special Brussels Institutions Act. A judicial review of regional decrees, compa-
rable to the existing review of ordinances, was introduced in the case law of the Court of Cassation
(Belgian Court of Cassation, no. C.08.0452.F, judgment of 21 April 2011).
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electoral districts for regional elections, or additional rules for the composition of
the Brussels parliament), albeit with certain limitations (excluded are for instance
the ratio of MPs in each linguistic group in the Brussels Capital Parliament, the
parity composition rule for the Brussels government, and the ‘alarm bell procedure’
protecting the rights of the Flemish minority).16
The pacification mechanisms protecting the Dutch-speaking minority in Brus-
sels function both at the legislative and at the executive level. The parliament of
the Brussels-Capital Region is split up in two linguistic groups. 72 parliamentarians
belong to the French-speaking group and a guaranteed number of 17 MPs make up
the Flemish linguistic group.17 At the legislative level, Flemish inhabitants of Brus-
sels are protected by the existence of pacification mechanisms such as an ‘alarm bell
procedure’18 and qualified majority ordinances.19 The composition of the govern-
ment of theBrussels-CapitalRegion follows the federal example of linguistic parity. It
consists of five ministers: the ‘linguistically neutral’ Minister-President, two French-
speaking Ministers, and two Dutch-speaking Ministers.20 It is clear that the small
Flemish minority is starkly overrepresented within the parliament, and even more
within the executive branch. These mechanisms, aimed at protecting the Flemish
minority of the capital make it almost impossible for the Brussels Region to legislate
without democratic support in both language groups.21
4.2.3 Brussels: Split into Two Communities
TheFlemish pursuit of cultural autonomy led to the creation of three communities: the
Flemish Community, the French Community and the German-speaking Community
(see Fig. 4.3). The concept of ’community’ refers to a group of people and the bond
that unifies them, namely their language and culture. Whilst the competences of
the regions are linked to the ‘territory’ and the ‘economy’, the competences of the
communities are linked to the ‘person’ and his or her ‘culture’. The communities
exercisematerial competences in person-relatedmatters (e.g.wellbeing policy, health
16The federal government held on to these constitutive competences as it didn’t want to allow
Brussels-Capital Region to modify the institutional mechanisms protecting the Dutch-speaking
minority in the capital (Peiffer 2015, pp. 88–94).
17Articles 14 and 23 Special Brussels Institutions Act.
18Three-quarters ofMPs in a linguistic group in theBrussels Parliament can table amotion declaring
that the provisions of a proposed ordinance are of such a nature as to seriously threaten rela-
tions between the communities. This motion suspends the parliamentary procedure, and starts a
consultation mechanism at executive level (Article 31 Special Brussels Institutions Act).
19Qualified majority ordinances can only be voted or amended when a majority of MPs in each
linguistic group vote in favour (Article 28 Special Brussels Institutions Act).
20Article 43 Special Brussels Institutions Act.
21Amirrored version of these samemechanisms can be found at the federal level where institutional
pacificationmechanismsprotect theFrench-speakingminority (e.g. parity in the federal government,
qualified majority laws, veto powers). See Van Ypersele 1997b, pp. 61–65.
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Fig. 4.3 The division of Belgium into three communities Source The authors
system, family policy, youth protection) and in cultural matters and education (e.g.
language, sports, media). Each community has its own parliament and government.
The asymmetry in Belgian federalism stems primarily from the imperfect congru-
ence between the borders of the regions and the communities.22 Brussels is an
autonomous region, but it lacks an own community. The contrary is true for the
German-speaking area (East Belgium). Whilst the question of the exercise of the
regional competences in the latter territory was easily handled by extending the
territorial jurisdiction of the Walloon region over East Belgium,23 the exercise of
community competences in Brussels proved a far more intricate conundrum.
In principle, the competences of the federated entities are governed by the idea of
territoriality: the regions and the communities only exercise competenceswithin their
territorial limits, and do so without competition with another federated entity. Thus,
the Flemish Community is prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over Flemings
living in the French-speaking area, and vice versa. The underlying idea is to have
only one competent authority for each and every competence in each and every part
of the country. However, given the lack of a Brussels Community in the Belgian
structure, for the exercise of community competences within the bilingual capital
the principle of territoriality is abandoned to a certain extent and aspects of personal
federalism surface.
22Swenden 2002, p. 74.
23This ‘solution’ has not been fully welcomed by local German-speaking politicians, who have been
demanding a transfer of all regional competences to the authorities of theGerman-speakingCommu-
nity. This would make the community responsible for all community and all regional competences
(Grundsatzerklärung des Parlaments zur Positionierung der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft im
Prozess der Staatsreform, Parliamentary documents of the Parliament of the German-Speaking
Community 2010–11, no. 83/2, p. 2). This article does not elaborate further on the German-speaking
Community as the discussion will be focused on the Brussels Capital Region.
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Thus, the jurisdiction of both the Flemish Community and the French Commu-
nity is stretched out over the bilingual area of Brussels-Capital. This means that
both communities do not only exercise territorial jurisdiction over ‘their’ respective
monolinguistic areas (the Flemish Community over the Dutch-speaking part in the
north of the country; and the French-speaking Community over the French-speaking
south respectively), but also exercise a form of personal jurisdiction over their own
communitywithinBrussels. In otherwords, the FrenchCommunity—to focus on one
of the two—comprises the whole population of the French-speaking area—including
Flemings living there—and the inhabitants of the bilingual areaBrussels-Capital who
adhere to the French Community. However, the Belgian Constitution forbids both
communities to directly target persons in Brussels, as this would require to identify
Brusselers as belonging to one or the other community. Instead, the two communities
must limit the exercise of their competences in Brussels to the institutions belonging
to their respective communities.24
This institution-logic approach ensures that the population of Brussels is not
forced to choose a sub-nationality. Comprehensively dividing the population of
Brussels into two sub-national groups, a Flemish community and a French commu-
nity, would be incredibly challenging—if not impossible—for multiple reasons that
include mixed-group marriages, as well as the presence of large groups of foreigners
and bilinguals who do not fit in this binary community-logic. As a result, in Brussels,
two parallel administrations are running their own network of public schools, day
care centres, sports clubs, museums, cultural centres and libraries. The prohibition
of sub-nationalities in Brussels entails that a person’s attachment to a community
through its network of institutions is always voluntary, non-exclusive and not defini-
tive.25 Residents of Brussels can choose to which community—French or Flemish—
to turn for government services, even on a case by case basis. French-speaking
parents may choose to send their child to a Dutch-speaking school (organized by the
Flemish Community) and to a French-speaking football club (a French Community
organization), and alter this choice at any given time.
Two ‘community commissions’ have been created to exercise (part of) the mono-
cultural and mono-person-related community competences in Brussels on behalf of
their respective communities.26 The French Community Commission (Commission
communautaire française, hereafter: COCOF) administers the responsibilities of the
French Community in the Brussels-Capital Region. The Assembly of the COCOF
consists of the 72 members of the French linguistic group in the Parliament of the
Brussels-Capital Region. The Flemish Community Commission (Vlaamse Gemeen-
schapscommissie, hereafter: VGC) is the extension of the Flemish Community in
the Brussels-Capital Region. The Assembly of the VGC consists of the 17 members
of the Flemish linguistic group in the Parliament of the Brussels-Capital Region.
24The adherence to a community can either be establishedon the basis of an institutions’ organization
(Article 128, §2 Belgian Constitution) or on the basis of an institutions’ activities (Article 127, §2
Belgian Constitution).
25Dumont and Van Drooghenbroeck 2011, pp. 201–226; Van Ypersele 1997a, pp. 20–21.
26Article 136 Belgian Constitution and Article 60 Special Brussels Institutions Act.
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With the risk of overburdening the reader with too much detail: while the VGC
only acts as a decentralized authority under the mandate of the Flemish Community,
the French Community has decided to transfer entire legislative competences to the
COCOF.27 As a result, the COCOF is not only a decentralized institution subordinate
to the FrenchCommunity, but also a legislative authority of its own, able to administer
its own community decrees within the Brussels territory.
Additionally, a third community commission has been created: the ‘Joint Commu-
nity Commission’ (Gemeenschappelijke Gemeenschapscommissie or Commission
communautaire commune, hereafter: COCOM).28 The COCOM is the competent
authority for person-related community matters not exclusively relating to one of
the two communities. Although the COCOM is a separate legal entity, its compe-
tences are exercised by the MPs and ministers of the Brussels-Capital Region. The
composition of the legislative and executive organ of the COCOM is the same as the
composition of the parliament and the government of the Brussels-Capital Region,
including the division in two language groups.29
TheCOCOMfills the void left by theFlemishCommunity and theFrenchCommu-
nity, which can neither directly target persons, nor target institutions not exclusively
adhering to one of the two communities. The COCOM is responsible for providing
direct assistance to citizens in Brussels, without the intervention of intermediary
institutions. The COCOM is competent for the so-called ‘bi-person-related commu-
nity matters’, i.e. the ‘person-related’ community competences that cannot be traced
back to one of the two communities. These institutions include, among others, hospi-
tals, sanatoriums, public centres for social welfare, centres of preventive medicine,
other health care institutions and centres of assistance for people with disabilities.
For the community competences in culturalmatters and education a same problem
arises as for person-related matters: following the system laid out above the Flemish
and French Community have only a limited competence for monolingual institu-
tions. Contrary to the choice for a Brussels institution—theCOCOM—for bi-person-
related matters, the federal government withholds the competence over the so-called
‘bicultural community matters’ in Brussels, i.e. activities and institutions in the field
of culture and education that do not adhere to either one of the two communities.
Existing examples include the National Orchestra of Belgium, the Centre for Fine
Arts Brussels and the Federal Opera House. Other examples could be bilingual
schools, multilingual sports centres etc.
For the sake of completeness, we shouldn’t forget that the federal government
exercises its own competences within the Brussels territory. In Belgium, federal
27Article 138 of the Belgian Constitution allows the French Community to transfer the commu-
nity competences exercised in the French-speaking area to the Walloon Region, and transfer the
community competences exercised in the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital to the COCOF.
28Article 135 Belgian Constitution and Article 60 Special Brussels Institutions Act.
29The president of the Government of the Brussels Capital Region however only has an advi-
sory voice (“voix consultative”, “raadgevende stem”) when presiding the executive organ (“collège
réuni”, “verenigd college”) of the COCOM (Article 77 Special Act 12 January 1989 on the Brussels
Institutions).
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competences include inter alia national security, social security, justice, police, civil
and criminal law, rail transport and public health.30
4.2.4 Brussels: A City Divided into 19 Municipalities
The previous sections elaborated on the complex division of competences between
the Brussels-Capital Region, the communities and the federal government in Brus-
sels. To add to the complexity of Brussels’ stratified institutional structure, compe-
tences are not only scattered between these authorities at a state level, but also at the
lower level. At the local level, the territory of the Brussels-Capital Region is divided
into nineteen decentralized municipalities. The distribution of powers between these
municipalities and the authorities with legislative power brings about an inefficient
fragmentation of competences.31
In order to understand the nature and powers of the municipalities in Brussels, we
must first explain the overarching model of territorial decentralization in Belgium.
In 1830,Belgiumwas founded as a territorially decentralized unitary state, divided
in 9 provinces and approximately 2500 municipalities.32 The provinces and munic-
ipalities or communes are subordinate governments. The central government (and
later also the Regions and the Communities) exercise an administrative supervision
over all acts of these decentralized institutions. The Belgian Constitution endows
the municipalities with the power over all matters of municipal interest and the
provinces with the power over all matters of provincial interest.33 This principle of
local autonomy, which plays an essential role to determine the competences of these
local authorities, has both a so-called positive and a negative dimension.
With regards to the municipalities, the positive dimension of the principle of local
autonomy implies that themunicipal council is competent for allmatters ofmunicipal
interest. According to the Constitutional Court the principle of local self-government
presupposes that local authorities are able to seize any object which they consider
to be in their interest, and to regulate as they feel appropriate.34 In general, munic-
ipalities exercise competences with regards to e.g. maintenance of municipal roads
and squares, municipal taxation, and maintenance of law and order. Other examples
of municipal competences are communal regulations regarding public parks, clean
streets, planning permission and cemeteries, or building communal schools, crèches,
sports centres and cultural centres.
The negative dimension of the local autonomy principle protects the local authori-
ties against any intrusive action by the higher authorities (theFederalGovernment, the
Regions and the Communities) aiming to limit the municipal sphere of competence.
30Vande Lanotte et al. 2006, p. 90.
31See Sect. 4.2.5.
32Alen and Haljan 2013, pp. 36–40.
33Articles 41 and 162 Belgian Constitution.
34Belgian Constitutional Court, no. 89/2010, judgement of 29 July 2010, B.18.2.
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The Constitution prohibits any disproportionate violation of municipal autonomy by
the higher authorities.35
Between 1960 and 1977 a large-scale process of municipal amalgamations
decreased the total number of municipalities with more than 75% to a little under
560.36 This major redesign of the landscape of territorial decentralized authorities
left the nineteen Brussels municipalities untouched. The decentralized structure of
Brussels today is a nineteenth-century relic with a far from logical demarcation of
municipal borders.
Even though the Brussels municipalities were never merged and persisted in their
nineteenth-century constellation, the municipal level has undergone some profound
changes in the past fifty years.
In an attempt to create a coordinating body for the nineteen municipalities, the
Brussels Agglomeration was created in 1971.37 The Agglomeration is a territorially
decentralized authority created to exercise some formermunicipal competences such
as taxi-policy, trash collection, waste management, the fire department and urgent
medical aid.38 The Brussels Agglomeration can be seen as the institutional prede-
cessor of the Region of Brussels-Capital, which was created in 1989 and took over
all the Agglomeration’s competences.
After the federalization process carved up Belgium along linguistic lines, the
former bilingual province Brabant became an anachronistic memory of the defunct
unitary Belgian State. In 1995, this province was split in two new provinces: the
province of Flemish Brabant (comprising the Brabant communes belonging to the
Flemish linguistic area) and the province ofWalloonBrabant (comprising theBrabant
communes belonging to the French linguistic area). Since Brussels was deemed to
countmore than enoughgoverning bodies already, the idea of creating a specificBrus-
sels Province was rejected.39 As a consequence, the nineteen Brabant municipalities
which make up the bilingual area Brussels-Capital were excluded from division into
provinces.40
4.2.5 Brussels: A Heart with Many Chambers
The present statute of Brussels is not the result of a conscious, deliberate choice. Both
Dutch-speaking and French-speaking politicians and academics agree that no one
35Belgian Constitutional Court, no. 89/2010, judgement of 29 July 2010, B.18.4.
36De Ceuninck et al. 2010, pp. 810–811.
37Article 165 Belgian Constitution; Article 1 Act 26 July 1971 regarding the Organisation of
Agglomerations and Federations of Municipalities, MB 24 August 1971.
38Article 4 Act 26 July 1971 regarding the Organisation of Agglomerations and Federations of
Municipalities, MB 24 August 1971.
39Van Orshoven 1993, p. 249; Clement et al. 1993, p. 133.
40Article 5, 2 Belgian Constitution.
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considers the current institutional architecture a desirable solution for Brussels.41 As
the political agreement which preceded the last Reform of State (2012–2014) stated:
‘In a lot of cases, this fragmentation of competences between the different authorities
in Brussels impedes an efficient and coherent metropolitan governance’.42
In Brussels day-to-day politics it is not unusual for a policy matter to be left
untouched or only dealt with after intense negotiations between different govern-
ments, often trying to pass on responsibility to one another. Environment, mobility,
and housing, for example, are regional matters, but the federal government and the
municipalities are also involved in these matters.43 One recent concrete example
might clarify this: in 2018–2019 the Brussels North station served as a clandes-
tine, temporary refuge for a number of immigrants, most of whom were most likely
planning to travel on (without authorization) to the UK. This created a clear need for
government initiative, to answer both the needs of the immigrants (whowere sleeping
in detrimental conditions on the floor of the station, with only limited sanitary equip-
ment), and to respond to reported instances of nuisance experienced by everyday
commuters. However, the national railway company and immigration are federal
matters, the station services buses from both the Brussels and the Flemish regional
bus companies (the drivers of the latter being the most vocal in complaining about
nuisance in this example), personal assistance should be provided by the COCOM,
and the station happens to be located right on the border between the municipal-
ities of Saint-Josse-ten-Noode and Schaerbeek, who are in charge of policing the
neighbourhood.
No government taking responsibility is not the only problem. The opposite has
happened as well: the Brussels Region trying to launch new policies, and bumping
into institutional limits. For instance, when the Brussels Region started to finance
day care centres and schools, the Constitutional Court annulled these government
programs on the ground that education and child care are community competences.44
Figure 4.4 gives an overview of the different legislators (at the non-local level)
active inBrussels and their respective competences as discussed above. This schedule
corresponds to the situation pre-2012. Themost recent changes—from the 2012 state
reform—will be discussed later on, as a stepping stone for our first proposal for
improvement.
41Delwit and Deschouwer 2009, p. 1; Maskens and Vandenbergh 2019, p. 19; Van Wynsberghe
2013, p. 100.
42Government Agreement Di Rupo I, 1 December 2011, p. 27, https://www.lachambre.
be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/searchlist/Accord_de_Gouvernement_1er_decembre_2011.pdf Accessed 1
November 2019.
43Van Wynsberghe 2013, pp. 100–101.
44Belgian Constitutional Court, no. 184/2011, judgement of 8 December 2011; Belgian Constitu-
tional Court, no. 67/2012, judgement of 24 May 2012.
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Fig. 4.4 The authorities with legislative powers in Brussels, pre-2012 Source The authors
4.3 Rethinking the Institutional Structure of Brussels
For readers without prior knowledge about Belgian constitutional law, the institu-
tional structure outlined above might appear extremely complicated. This is not less
the case for the population of Brussels (or of Belgium as awhole), and even for politi-
cians, policy makers, activists, journalists, and others who work with and within this
structure on an everyday basis. This section aims to rethink Brussels’ constitutional
framework, putting the Capital Region at the centre of its own constitutional design.
The aim is to strengthen efficiency and transparency, assuming it is a precondition
of true citizenship that people should be able to understand governmental structures.
In what follows, we therefore develop two intertwined propositions.
First, Sect. 4.3.1 discusses the optimization of Brussels as a federated entity.
Building on recent evolutions from the ‘Sixth State Reform’ (2012) and on proposals
from legal and political doctrine, we develop a scheme of Brussels as a fully-fledged
federal entity, holding not only regional competences, but also community compe-
tences. This would not only eliminate a whole layer of complexity in the institutional
scheme, it would also facilitate new policies, such as the creation of true Brussels
bilingual educational or cultural initiatives.
Secondly, in Sect. 4.3.2 the possibility is explored ofmerging the 19municipalities
of the Brussels region into one single local authority, coinciding with the regional
authority. In order to maintain a level of political participation closer to the citizens,
a number of districts whose borders may or may not coincide with those of today’s
communes could be created simultaneously.
4.3.1 Brussels as a Region Community?
Over the last fifty years, consecutive amendments of the Belgian state structure have
time after time added to the complexity of Belgian federalism as a whole, and—
particularly—of Brussels as its capital region. The 2012–2014 ‘Sixth State Reform’
was no exception to this dynamic. One of the many changes it introduced concerned
the competence for ‘bicultural’ matters in Brussels. As outlined above, bicultural
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Fig. 4.5 The authorities with legislative powers in Brussels, since 2012 Source The authors
matters in Brussels remained a competence of the federal government. This specific
competence seems to have slipped the attention of the federal government as the
amount of government initiatives taken within this field in the last decades are few.45
This comes as no surprise. As the competences for culture, media and communi-
cation have been transferred to the Communities in the first stage of the process of
federalization in 1970, the federal administration nowadays lacks the relevant struc-
ture, expertise and incentives to take bicultural initiatives in Brussels. To remedy the
inaction of the federal government, the competence for certain bicultural matters
was transferred to the Brussels region in 2012–2014, thus adding an extra layer
of complexity to the Belgian system. This transfer concerned three specific bicul-
tural matters: the financing of municipal sport infrastructure; vocational training; and
bicultural matters of regional concern related to the fine arts, the cultural patrimony,
museums and other scientific-cultural institutions.46
Thus, a limited number of community competences was assigned to a regional
authority. The result is shown in Fig. 4.5.
We propose to deepen this recent complication in order to—paradoxically—arrive
at a simplification of Brussels’ institutional structure. Continuing on the path of the
last reform our proposal is to make the Brussels Region competent for all community
competences, at least as far as they are not monocultural or mono-person-related. In
otherwords, the remaining federal ‘bicultural’ competences for culture and education
should be transferred to the Brussels Region. The regional institutions should also
take over the bi-person-related competences currently assigned to the COCOM.
By transferring the bicultural and bi-person-related community competences to
the Brussels Region the number of competent authorities can be reduced, simpli-
fying the overall structure and thus its transparency. First, the COCOM would cease
to exist. Thereby, the artificial distinctionwhereby the samepoliticians are considered
to represent the Region or the COCOM depending on the matter at stake would be
abandoned.47 However, abolishing the COCOM raises another question. Should the
45Dumont and Vancrayebeck 2008, p. 252; Lievens 2014, p. 287.
46Article 135bisBelgianConstitution andArticle 4bis Special Brussels InstitutionsAct; see Lievens
2014, pp. 282–286.
47The main feature of COCOM decision making—a requirement of a special majority for all its
competences, requiring half or a third of votes from both language groups—could be maintained
for ‘bi-person-related’ matters within the regional system. Another option—that does not need to
be linked to our proposal—is to evaluate and potentially adapt the special majority system.
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COCOM decision making requirements—a special majority for all its competences,
requiring half or a third of votes from both language groups—be maintained in the
regional system? Maintaining the status quo for ‘bi-person-related’ matters in Brus-
sels (and even in specified regional matters, such as the organization of local institu-
tions) might decrease the benefit of “simplification” and “transparency”. Conversely,
altering the status quomight be considered non-negotiable for Flemingswhoconsider
the special majority requirement to be a crucial aspect of the protection of their
minority position. Another option is to evaluate and potentially adapt the special
majority system in community affairs in Brussels. A broader evaluation could entail
a redefinition of the numerical thresholds, a change in the competences for which a
special majority is required, or even an adaptation of the number of representatives
in each of both language groups or a reconfiguration of the language group system as
a whole. Given the sensitivity of these matters, we believe it is primarily a political
task to find a balance in this within the larger institutional compromise.
Secondly, the federal government would no longer be one of the legislators for
community matters, a role it was in practice not (fully) fulfilling anyway. Control
on compulsory education would thus become a competence of the Brussels Region,
besides bi- or multilingual radio stations, television, day care, schools etc.
Thirdly, in order to better match the multilingual reality of Brussels daily life
we suggest to no longer speak of ‘bicultural’ and ‘bi-person-related’ competences.
Instead we propose a new terminology, speaking of multicultural and multi-person-
related competences when referring to non-monocultural and non-mono-person-
related competences.
Although the Brussels Region gains competences for all community matters, the
distinction between mono- and multi-cultural (or mono- and multi-person-related)
matters remains relevant. TheFlemish andFrenchCommunitywill remain competent
for monocultural and mono-person-related initiatives. As much as there seems to be
a political desire by Brussels’ politicians to take these community competences into
their own ‘regional’ hands, an equally legitimate interest can be identified from the
side of the two communities to continue their support of cultural, educational and
‘mono-person-related’ institutions within the Brussels territory.
The purpose is not to give Brussels a competing parallel competence for those
monocultural or mono-person-related matters. Neither do we intend to allow the
French and Flemish Community to actively support multi-cultural or multi-person-
related initiatives. Nevertheless, a certain ‘competition’ cannot be excluded. Imagine
the situation where both the Brussels Region and the Flemish Community intend to
open amuseumwith the same theme (e.g. Tintin—or inDutch:Kuifje); or where both
the Communities and the Region were to open schools or day care centres. If wewant
to honor the legitimate claims of both the multilingual Brussels authorities and the
monolingual communities, such parallel ‘competing’ initiatives seem unavoidable.
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Even today, some competences are already being taken care of by both the Brussels
Region and the Communities.48
In our proposal the Brussels Region will become competent for all multicultural
and multi-person-related matters. Legally speaking, the distinction between multi-
cultural competences (as rooted inArticle 127 of the Constitution, currently a compe-
tence of the federal government and—partly—of the Brussels Region) and multi-
person-related competences (as rooted in Article 128 of the Constitution, currently
a COCOM competence) would cease to exist. Politically however the distinction
might remain relevant.49
In cultural matters, including in education, the Flemish and French Community
can continue to play a major role. The existing network of schools and the, mostly
Flemish, desire to maintain ‘proper’ cultural institutions within the shared bilingual
capital are important elements here. Meanwhile we propose allowing the Brussels
Region to develop a complementarymultilingual education policy, surpassing the rift
between both communities, fully addressing the population of Brussels as a whole.50
Thus, local and international cultural institutions or events could be organized under
regional policy—in addition to the existing community initiatives. Even a candidacy
by the regional government for the Olympics (which is nowadays not possible as the
competence for sport is a community one) should be feasible.51
For person-related matters we envision a future in which the primary responsi-
bility befalls the Brussels Region. The Region would thereby aim to provide the
entire population of the capital with all services relating to ‘person-related’ matters.
Additionally—building on an in itself sufficient ground level of services provided by
the Region—the communities can operate in this same field, although only through
monolingual institutions (mono-person-related matters). An important condition for
this scenario to attract political support from both communities is that sufficient
guarantees should be given to the Flemish (Dutch-speaking) minority of the Brussels
Region to retain access to quality services in their own language.
Although the institutional framework of the shared capital will inevitably retain
a certain level of complexity, our proposal allows for a clear simplification. This is
made visible in Fig. 4.6: one authority is abolished (the COCOM) and three columns
of competences are merged into one. The different multicultural and multi-person-
related competences—which we have labelled ‘multi-community competences’—
are now brought together under the authority of the Brussels-Capital Region.
By increasing the role of the Brussels Region for community competences, the
Region can develop a common policy for its entire territory, looking beyond the
distinction between community and regional competences and fully addressing
48Thus both the Region and the Communities are providing rental wheelchairs to people with
disabilities (see Loosveldt 2017, p. 406).
49Dumont and El Berhoumi 2018.
50El Berhoumi et al. 2019.
51See on sports: Parliamentary Proceedings of the Parliament of Brussels Capital Region 2002–03,
nr. 55, p. 10.
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Fig. 4.6 The authorities with legislative powers in Brussels, proposal Source The authors
the entire population, whether their mother tongue is Dutch, French or any other
language.
This proposal is more than an academic exercise. It answers a returning demand of
Brussels’ authorities to be awarded ‘fuller’ competences, and contributes to making
the institutional framework less complex, and thus more accessible for the citizens.
Proponents of this proposal will welcome this simplification of an overly complex
constitutional framework, as well as the potential efficiency that can be gained with
it. Opponents might fear a weakening of the position of the Flemish minority in
Brussels. TheBrussels Fleming is said to be strongly attached to the strong network of
Flemish Community institutions in Brussels. It is important to note that the proposal
here discussed does not aim to annul Flemish initiatives in the capital. The position
of Flemish schools and cultural institutions in Brussels will remain the same (the
only thing changing being the creation of a competence for the Brussels Region to
take the initiative for a parallel multilingual policy, e.g. by providing subsidies to
bilingual educational initiatives).
Our proposal allows the Region to develop a common and fully fledged policy
for the entire territory of Brussels. As it aims to strengthen efficiency, simplification
and transparency, we deem it perfectly combinable with another evolution: a fusion
of the 19 existing communes making up the Brussels Region, with a centralization
of communal power at the regional level.
4.3.2 Brussels as a City Region?
With regard to the institutional reform at the local level in Brussels, a heated debate
exists between so-called ‘regionalists’ and ‘municipalists’. Regionalists wish to rein-
force the Brussels-Capital Region by either endowing the Region with competences
which are traditionally exercised by themunicipalities, or bymerging the communes,
or even by suppressing the municipal level as a whole.52 Municipalists, on the other
52See Sottiaux 2013, pp. 29–30.
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hand, are in favour of conserving strong municipalities in the Brussels institutional
structure.53
Let us have a closer look at the arguments of both sides in this debate. Proponents
of a strong local level often invoke the proximity and democratic representativeness of
municipalities. These local authorities are the lowest representative political body,
which offers the citizen the opportunity of participating effectively in the making
of decisions affecting their everyday environment.54 Political representatives at the
municipal level are in close contact with citizens and havemore concrete field knowl-
edge. Furthermore, the principle of local autonomymeans that the municipalities are
not confined to the area of regional powers. The municipalities can take action in all
matters of municipal interest, enabling them to manage cross-cutting policies irre-
spective of the exclusive division of powers between the Brussels-Capital Region, the
Communities and the federal government. The municipal level is therefore the only
place where powers which are scattered between the higher authorities in Brussels,
are consolidated.55
Regionalists stress that nineteen municipalities, with different local interests and
political coalitions, are incapable of bringing an integrated and efficient governance
for the whole city. Only the Region is able to bring coherence to largescale policies
and promote the regional interest as a whole, in contrast with the 19 municipali-
ties that rarely transcend their own local interest.56 Secondly, developing a policy
at the level of the Region allows more economy of scale and entails a solidarity
mechanism between inhabitants of richer and poorer municipalities. Operating at
the regional level allows for inequalities to be made up for on a larger scale through
the redistribution of means or through social adjustment mechanisms.57
Over the past years, regionalists have tabled a number of proposals rethinking
the place of the municipalities in the institutional system. The status, competences
and even the continued existence of Brussels’ 19 municipalities are increasingly
questioned.58 These proposals are generally centred around one of two main axes.
The first category of proposals focuses on reorganizing the competences between
the local level and the Brussels-Capital Region. The second, more drastic, set of
proposals envisions some municipal amalgamations, a complete fusion of the nine-
teen municipalities or even a total abolition of the municipal level in Brussels. In the
last scenario, the Brussels-Capital Region would absorb the municipal competences
and become a city region, acting both as a subordinate, territorially decentralized
authority and as a federated entity.59 It is important to take both the municipalist
arguments and the arguments pro-regionalization into account when contemplating
53See Cadranel and Mossoux 2014, pp. 449–457.
54Lagasse 2012, pp. 6–7; Sottiaux 2013, p. 28.
55See Cadranel and Mossoux 2014, pp. 455–456; Lagasse 2012, pp. 6–7.
56Lagasse 2012, p. 8.
57Ibid.
58For some examples, see Maskens and Vandenbergh 2019, pp. 25–29; Nassaux 2018, pp. 18–19;
Van Haute et al. 2018, pp. 33–104.
59Nassaux 2018, pp. 31–32.
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a reform of the local level in Brussels. We propose to merge the 19 municipalities of
the Brussels Region into one single local authority. That authority is to coincide with
the regional authority, thus avoiding a conflict of two territorially overlapping enti-
ties: a Brussels-Capital City and a Brussels-Capital Region. This should allow more
economy of scale and enable Brussels-Capital Region to govern thewhole territory in
an integrated and efficient way. In order to maintain a level of political participation
closer to the citizens, a number of districts whose borders may or may not coincide
with those of today’s communes could be created simultaneously. The most impor-
tant difference between the present-daymunicipalities and the newly created districts
is the absence of the constitutional protection of local autonomy. As was mentioned
above, the local autonomy principle forbids the Region to intrude in the municipal
sphere of competence by harmonizing, coordinating or even taking over municipal
competences in a disproportionate way. Districts do not fall under the protection
of local autonomy. An ordinance of the Brussels-Capital Parliament can define the
competences, working rules and mode of election of these intra-municipal territorial
bodies.60 This allows the Brussels-Capital Region to decide autonomously on the
division of competences between the higher authorities and the districts without any
constitutional constraints, placing Brussels again at the centre of its own institutional
design.
4.4 Conclusion
Leaving the EU aside, the Brussels territory is governed by no less than six govern-
ments with formal legislative power. Federal, regional, community and local compe-
tences havebeen awarded to amultilayered institutional framework lacking efficiency
and transparency. Section 4.2 explored the many institutions that govern the Brussels
territory, and their respective competences. Although Brussels is physically at the
heart of the Belgian federation, institutionally it has been treated as an afterthought
of opposing Flemish and Walloon constitutional desires.
Building on this framework, Sect. 4.3 described how constitutional change can
improve Brussels’ institutional design. The developed proposal is twofold. A first
improvement consists of a transfer of formal legislative powers to the Brussels-
Capital Region. The Capital Region should acquire full competences for bicultural
and bi-person-related—to be calledmulticultural andmulti-person-related—matters.
On the one hand, thiswould deprive theCOCOMof all its competences, thus reducing
the number of federated entities within the Belgian framework. On the other hand,
it would end the competence of the federal government for bicultural matters, thus
providing a solution for the frustration of Brussels’ politicians with the inaction at
the federal level.
60Article 41 Belgian Constitution.
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A second improvement is to bemade at the local level. Our proposal is tomerge the
19 municipalities of the Brussels Region into one single local authority, coinciding
with the regional authority. Under the authority of the Brussels-Capital Parliament
a number of districts could be created to maintain a level of political participation
closer to the citizens.
Our proposal enables theBrussels-Capital Region to developmore coherent policy
initiatives, crossing the artificial boundaries between community, regional and local
matters, and addressing the multilingual population of Brussels as a whole. By doing
so, it answers some of the fundamental flaws of the constitutional design of Brus-
sels—today a malfunctioning pacemaker—and allows the capital to evolve into the
true heart of the Belgian federation.
References
Alen A, Haljan D (2013) Belgium. In: Alen A, Haljan D (eds) The International Encyclopedia of
Laws, Constitutional Law. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp 1–314
Billen C (2013) The history of a political capital. In: Corijn E, van de Ven J (eds) The Brussels
reader: a small world city to become the capital of Europe. VUBpress, Brussels, pp 62–80
Cadranel B, Mossoux Y (2014) L’articulation des compétences régionales et locales dans la Région
de Bruxelles-Capitale: l’autonomie locale menacée ou recadrée? In: Sautois J, Uyttendaele M
(eds) La sixième réforme de l’État (2012-2013) - Tournant historique ou soubresaut ordinaire?
Anthemis, Limal, pp 449–487
Clement J, D’Hondt H, Van Crombrugge J, Vanderveeren C (1993) Het Sint-Michielsakkoord en
zijn achtergronden. Maklu-Uitgevers, Antwerp
De Ceuninck K, Reynaert H, Steyvers K, Valcke T (2010) Municipal Amalgamations in the Low
Countries: Same Problems, Different Solutions. Local Government Studies 36(6):803–822
Delwit P,DeschouwerK (2009) The institutions ofBrussels. Brussels Studies SynopsysCFB14:1–9
Demol J (1997) A description of the Brussels Institutions. In: Detant A (ed) Brussels - Jerusalem:
conflict management and conflict resolution in divided cities: a comparative research project.
VUB Centre for the interdisciplinary study of Brussels, Brussels, pp 2–16
Dumont H, El Berhoumi M (2018) Pour simplifier Bruxelles, La Libre 23 January
2018, https://www.lalibre.be/debats/opinions/pour-simplifier-bruxelles-opinion-5a660bedcd70
b09cefcc6e1a Accessed 1 November 2019.
Dumont H, Vancrayebeck L (2008) L’exercice des compétences communautaires à Bruxelles.
Chroniques de Droit Public/Publiekrechtelijke Kronieken 1:187–196
Dumont H, Van Drooghenbroeck S (2011) L’interdiction des sous-nationalités à Bruxelles.
Administration Publique Trimestriel 3:201–226
El Berhoumi M, Sautois J, Slautsky E (2019) Étude juridique relative à la création d’écoles
dispensant un enseignement bilingue en Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, Brussels Studies Institute
31 March 2019, https://bsi.brussels/research/etude-juridique-relative-a-la-creation-decoles-dis
pensant-un-enseignement-bilingue-en-region-de-bruxelles-capitale/Accessed1November 2019.
Elst M, Van Nieuwenhove J (2017) Constitutieve bevoegdheden ("constitutieve autonomie"). In:
Seutin B, van Haegendoren G (eds) De transversale bevoegdheden in het federale België. Die
Keure, Bruges, pp 63–108
Janssens R (2018) BRIO language barometer 4: Languages in Brussels. Brio, Brussels
Lagasse N (2012) Organisation of powers between Region and municipalities in Brussels: going
beyond the antagonism of the “Tina” and “Nimby” approaches. Brussels Studies 61:1–13
74 J. Lievens and K. Reybrouck
Lievens J (2014) Brussel volgens de Zesde Staatshervorming. In: Alen A, Dalle B, Muylle K, Pas
W, Van Nieuwenhove J, Verrijdt W (eds) Het federale België na de Zesde Staatshervorming. Die
Keure, Bruges, pp 227–304
Loosveldt G (2017) Het beleid inzake personen met een handicap. In: Seutin B, van Haegendoren
G (eds) De bevoegdheden van de gemeenschappen. Die Keure, Bruges, pp 387–410
MaskensA,VandenberghY (2019) En finir avec l’imbroglio institutionnel. In: AulaMagna,Demain
Bruxelles. Petite Collection Politique, Brussels, 17–30
Nassaux J-P (2018) Le retour du débat institutionnel bruxellois (2016-2018). Chroniques Hebdo-
madaires du CRISP 2374:1–36
Peiffer Q (2015) Autonomie constitutive. In: Uyttendaele M, Verdussen M (eds) Dictionnaire de la
Sixième Réforme de l’Etat. Larcier, Brussels, pp 73–98
Popelier P (2019) Asymmetry and Complexity as a Device for Multinational Conflict Management.
A Country Study of Constitutional Asymmetry in Belgium. In: Popelier P, Sahadžić M (eds)
Constitutional Asymmetry in Multinational Federalism: Managing Multinationalism in Multi-
tiered Systems. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp 17–46
Popelier P, Lemmens K (2015) The Constitution of Belgium: A Contextual Analysis. Hart, Oxford
Sottiaux S (2013) Is small beautiful after all? Reply to Wouter Van Doornen & Dave Sinardet. In:
Van Dooren W, Sinardet D (eds) Must Brussels’s communes be merged?: The experiences of
Antwerp, Berlin and Vienna. Rethinking Belgium e-book 13, Brussels, pp 28–30
Swenden W (2002) Asymmetric Federalism and Coalition-Making in Belgium. Publius 32:3–67.
Treffers-Daller J (2002) Language Use and Language Contact in Brussels. Journal of Multilingual
and Multicultural Development 23:50–64
Van Haute E, Deschouwer K, Gaudin T, Janssens R, Kavadias D, Mares A, Paulis E, Pilet J-B,
Sierens V, Tibbaut A (2018) Gouvernance à Bruxelles - rapport final. Joint Research Group
DEGO – The Politics of Democratic Governance ULB/VUB, Brussels
Van Orshoven P (1993) Brussel, Brabant en de minderheden. In: Alen A, Suetens L P (eds) Het
federale België na de vierde staatshervorming. Die Keure, Bruges, pp 227–264
Van Velthoven H (1989) The relationship between Flanders and Brussels from 1830 to 1980, Mech-
anisms of power in a historical context. In: Deprez K (ed) Language and Intergroup Relations in
Flanders and in the Netherlands. Foris Publications, Dordrecht, pp 11–28
Van Wynsberghe C (2013) Institutional complexity as consensus model. In: Corijn E, van de Ven
J (eds) The Brussels reader: a small world city to become the capital of Europe. VUBpress,
Brussels, pp 94–107
VanYpersele J (1997a) The Institutional Balance in Brussels. The Influence of the Bounds that Bind
the Brussels Inhabitants to their Respective Community. In: Detant A (ed) Brussels - Jerusalem:
conflict management and conflict resolution in divided cities: a comparative research project.
VUB Centre for the interdisciplinary study of Brussels, Brussels, pp 17–39
Van Ypersele J (1997b) The Protection of Linguistic Minorities in Brussels and its Outskirts. In:
Detant A (ed) Brussels - Jerusalem: conflict management and conflict resolution in divided cities:
a comparative research project. VUB Centre for the interdisciplinary study of Brussels, Brussels,
pp 57–81
Vande Lanotte J, Bracke S, Goedertier G (2006) Belgium for beginners: a guide through the Belgian
labyrinth. Die Keure, Bruges
Witte E (1987) Socio-Political Aspects. Bilingual Brussels as an Indication of Growing Polit-
ical Tensions. In: Witte E, Baetens Beardsmore H (eds) The interdisciplinary study of Urban
Bilingualism in Brussels. Multilingualism Matters, Clevedon, pp 47–74
Johan Lievens is an Assistant Professor in Constitutional Law at VU Amsterdam, and an affili-
ated Senior Researcher at the Leuven Centre for Public Law (KU Leuven). He wrote a Ph.D. thesis
on the constitutionally protected freedom of education. His research and teaching involves Dutch
and Belgian constitutional law, education law and discrimination law, with a particular focus on
4 Reanimating Brussels—The Beating Heart of the Belgian Federation 75
Belgian federalism and LGBTI+ rights. He obtained a Master’s Degree in Law at the KU Leuven
(2013, magna cum laude) and an LLM at Harvard Law School (2016).
Karel Reybrouck is a Ph.D. researcher in Constitutional Law and Federalism at the Leuven
Centre for Public Law (KU Leuven). He is writing his doctoral thesis on the division of powers in
federal systems, with a particular focus on Belgium and the European Union. Karel was a visiting
researcher at Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2018) and
the Centre for Asian Legal Studies at NUS (2020). He co-authored a book on the federal powers
in Belgium (Intersentia, 2019) with his doctoral supervisor Stefan Sottiaux. Karel Reybrouck is
involved in the organization of tutorials, seminars and master theses in the field of Belgian public
law and comparative constitutional law. He obtained his Master’s Degree in Law at KU Leuven
(July 2015, magna cum laude).
